Timothy Leonard Wood, Individually And Timothyleonard Wood, As Guardian Ad Litem For Timothy Johnathan Wood, A Minor : Brief of Respondents by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983
Timothy Leonard Wood, Individually And
Timothyleonard Wood, As Guardian Ad Litem For
Timothy Johnathan Wood, A Minor : Brief of
Respondents
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Elliott J. Williams and Bruce H. Jensen; Attorneys for
Respondents
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wood v. Stratton, No. 19336 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4202
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY LEONARD WOOD, 
individually, and TIMOTHY 
LEONARD WOOD, as guardian 
ad litem for TIMOTHY 
JOHNATHAN WOOD, a minor, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WINSTON STRATTON and 
TRACY STRATTON, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19336 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of Washington County, 
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge 
JIM R. SCARTH 
Attorney for Appellant 
724 East St. George Boulevard 
P.O. Box 577 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 637-4839 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
BRUCE H. JENSEN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondents 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
Ff LED 
OCT l ~ i983 
---~-··••••O••••••o••••O•••H••-..-....a 
c;.1~ !;:..::-·,,,:.~> ec.::~. t:~.:.:1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY LEONARD WOOD, 
individually, and TIMOTHY 
LEONARD WOOD, as guardian 
ad litem for TIMOTHY 
JOHNATHAN WOOD, a minor, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WINSTON STRATTON and 
TRACY STRATTON, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19336 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of Washington County, 
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, Judge 
JIM R. SCARTH 
Attorney for Appellant 
724 East St. George Boulevard 
P.O. Box 577 
St, George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 637-4839 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
BRUCE H. JENSEN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondents 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
T~BLE OF AUTHORITIES . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELII:F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
QUESTION OlJ APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUViENT . 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CARRY 
HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING UPON THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .. 
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT 
WAS PROPER, GIVEN PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO 
MAKE A SPECIFIC SHOWING TO THE LOWER COURT 
OF AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH WOULD 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS 
A. The Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was Timely . . . . 
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment was Properly Supported 
C. Plaintiff did not Present Timely 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion in 
the Lower court . . . . . 
POINT III. UNDER PRESENT UTAH LAW, THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS PROPER UPON 
ANY VIEW OF THE RECORD 
C<:1NCLUSION 
i 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
8 
9 
11 
11 
14 
23 
25 
CASES CITED, Con't. 
Ucker~an v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 
588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978) ........ . 
United American Life Ins. Co. v. Willey, 21 Utah 2d 
279, 444 P.2d 755 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-9-1 et ~· ( 19 53) . 2, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1953) 21 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY LEONARD WOOD, 
individually, and TIMOTHY 
LEONARD WOOD, as guardian 
ad Jitem for TIMOTHY 
JOHNATHAN WOOD, a minor, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WINSTON STRATTON and TRACY 
STRATTON, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19336 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for wrongful death arising from a 
single-car accident in Washington County, Utah. Plaintiff 
Timothy Leonard Wood is the father of Timothy Johnathan Wood, 
deceased, who died as a result of injuries sustained while 
riding as a passenger in a vehicle operated by respondent 
Tracy Stratton and owned by respondent Winston Stratton. The 
parties will be designated as they appeared below. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the defendants' joint Motion for 
oummary Judgment. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants 
and against the plaintiff on June 16, 1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants ask this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
lower court. 
QUESTION ON APPEAL 
Has the plaintiff established, upon the record before 
this Court, that he presented to the lower court a timely and 
specific showing of the existence of a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether defendants were guilty of willful 
misconduct which proximately caused the death of plaintiff's 
decedent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the reasons stated in Point I of the Argument which 
follows, the only facts discernible from the record on appeal 
concern the procedural disposition of this case in the lower 
court. 
The single-vehicle accident underlying this action occur-
red on or about April 23, 1982. [R. l]. The plaintiff's 
Complaint was filed on August 6, 1982. [R. l]. The defen-
dants' Answer, raising inter alia the defense of the Utah 
Guest Statute, Utah Code Ann. §41-9-1 ~- (1953), was 
filed with the lower court on September 23, 1982. 
Following extensive discovery, including the taking of 
five depositions, the defendants filed a joint Motion for 
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s 11 mmary JudgmPnt and Motion to Publish with a supporting 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities on May 26, 1983. (R. 
9-17, 16-19]. The motion and memorandum were served upon 
counsel for plaintiff one day earlier, on May 25, 1983. (R. 
11, 20 l . 
under the calendaring procedures of the lower court, the 
defendants' motions came on for decision before the Honorable 
J. Harlan Burns on June 7, 1983. 1 Judge Burns continued 
the matter to the following day, June 8. [R. 21]. On June 
B, Judge Burns took the matter under advisement for ruling; 
the plaintiff's time for responding to defendants' motions 
had run without plaintiff having filed any counter-affidavits 
or materials in opposition to defendants' motions. [R. 22]. 
The lower court subsequently granted defendants' motions 
and a proposed form of judgment was mailed by defense counsel 
to the court and counsel for plaintiff on June 9, 1983, pur-
suant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah. [R. 36-38; 
The procedure of the Fifth Judicial District Court 
is to call up all motions on the court calendar for review 
and decision at the expiration of the ten day period allowed 
by Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the 
State of Utah, for filing a response to the motion. 
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Appendix, p. l]. No objection to the proposed form of judg-
ment was filed by plaintiff. The lower court signed and 
entered the Summary Judgment on June 16, 1983. [R. 36-37] 
Following receipt of notification of the lower court's 
decision, counsel for plaintiff belatedly filed a number of 
materials in opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, including so-called "abstracts" of depositions. 
(R. 24-28]. At no time has counsel for plaintiff denied 
receipt of defendants' motion and memorandum or the proposed 
judgment. 
The plaintiff's Notice of Appeal was filed July 15, 
1983. [R. 63]. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF 
SHOWING UPON THE RECORD ON APPEAL THAT THE 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
An appellant has the affirmative burden of showing, upon 
the record on appeal, how the lower court erred with respect 
to the order or judgment upon which the appeal is based. 
Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 1976); ~ 
Hamid v. Sew Original, 645 P.2d 496, 497 (Okla. 1982) [Legal 
error is not presumed from a silent record]. Under Utah la» 
the judgment of the lower court is presumed correct until 
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this affirmative burden has been met. Tucker Realty, Inc. v. 
Nunlev, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 412-13 (1964). 
An appellant's showing of error must be made solely upon 
the record before the reviewing court. This Court has con-
sistently followed the well-recognized rule of appellate 
review that matters not a part of the record before the 
reoiewing court need not, and indeed cannot, be considered in 
connection with the appeal. Ockerman v. Lincoln National 
Life Insurance Company, 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978); In re 
Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128, n. 1 (Utah 1978). This rule 
was most recently reaffirmed by this Court's opinion in 
Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, No. 18413 (Slip Opinion, 
July 28, 1983). Justice Oaks, for a unanimous court, wrote: 
Plaintiff does not contest these propositions, 
but maintains that the reasonableness of its fees is 
not before us on this appeal. In arguing this 
point, both parties encumber their briefs with 
assertions of facts about what went on in the 
hearing before the arbitrator for which there is no 
reference to the record and no support in the 
record. We ignore all such matters and base our 
decision solely upon the facts shown in the record. 
· No. 18 413, at p. 2. 
Where only a partial record is presented to the reviewing 
court, it is presumed that the remaining record below sup-
ports the judgment of the trial court. Tucker Realty, Inc. 
~Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 413 (1964); Bennett 
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Leasing Company v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246, 247 
(1963). 
Utah law charges the appellant with the responsibility 
and burden of bringing before the reviewing court a record 
upon which the merit of his position can be ascertained. 
Bennett Leasing Company v. Ellison, supra. In the absence of 
an appellate record sufficient to document the alleged trial 
court error, the judgment of the lower court is presumed 
valid and must be sustained. 
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 
(1959), this court affirmed the trial court's summary judg-
ment dismissing the plaintiff's claim for damages arising 
from an intersection collision. The Court wrote: 
When a summary judgment is granted against a 
party, he is entitled to have the trial court, and 
this court on review, consider all of the evidence 
and every inference fairly to be derived therefrom 
in the light most favorable to him. This rule, 
relied upon by the plaintiff, is not very helpful 
here because the only facts before us are contained 
in the above-mentioned documents and the recitals in 
the judgment signed by the trial court based upon 
the pretrial conference. In the absence of any 
other record it stands unassailed as reflecting the 
facts presented to the court. If the plaintiff con-
tends to the contrary, he has the burden of bringing 
the record here to show otherwise, because the bur-
den is upon the appellant to show error. 
337 P.2d at 60 [Footnotes omitted]. 
Similarly, in Joseph, M.D. v. Markovitz, M.D., 551 P.2d 
571 (Ariz. App. 1976), the appellate court was called upon~ 
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1 Pvi~w a summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor 
of the defendants. In affirming the judgment, the Arizona 
court of Appeals followed the same rationale relied upon by 
the Utah court: 
We recognize that a summary judgment must be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom it was directed and that it is inappro-
priate if there is any doubt as to whether an issue 
of material fact exists. • • • However, when a 
motion for summary judgment is supported by proof of 
specific facts which would defeat plaintiff's claim, 
plaintiff must then come foward to show the exis-
tence of a genuine factual issue. 
On appeal, an appellant must be able to point 
to an issue of fact in the record which renders the 
summary judgment improper. • • • The record here 
is void of any evidence [supporting plaintiff's 
allegations]. 
551 P.2d at 574 [Citations omitted]. 
In his brief, plaintiff relies upon four depositions 
taken by these defendants below for the proposition that 
there exists a material question of fact as to whether the 
defendants were guilty of willful misconduct in causing the 
accident. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 2-6]. Despite his 
alieqed reliance on these depositions, plaintiff failed to 
nesignate them as a part of the record on appeal. [R. 
65-66). Plaintiff's belated attempt to supplement the record 
on appeal to include these depositions is not only untimely 
but ineffective. At this juncture of the proceedings, the 
record on appeal may only be modified by stipulation of the 
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parties or court order. Rule 75(h), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Tuc~er Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 1q~ 
P.2d 410,413 (1964). Plaintiff has never obtained an appro-
priate order and, therefore, the depositions are not a part 
of the record before this Court. 
Since the evidence relied upon by the appellant for his 
showing of error by the lower court is not a proper part of 
the record on appeal, Utah case law dictates that the judg-
ment granted these defendants by the trial court be presumed 
correct, that the record below be presumed to support the 
trial court's ruling, and that the judgment of the trial 
court be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS PROPER, 
GIVEN PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO MAKE A SPE-
CIFIC SHOWING TO THE LOWER COURT OF AN 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS. 
Summary judgment is the appropriate remedy to avoid the 
time, effort and expense of trial, for both the parties and 
court, where the pleadings, depositions and admissions on 
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Holbrook 
Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
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Plaintiff contends on appeal that the lower court erred 
j;, granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for three 
rt:asons: (1) the motion was premature given the posture of 
the case [Brief of Appellant, p. 13]: (2) the motion was 
defective because it was not supported by affidavits [Brief 
of Appellant, pp. 5-7]: and (3) the case record before the 
lower court contained material questions of fact on the issue 
of defendants' willful misconduct [Brief of Appellant, p. 7]. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governs the tim-
ing and procedure for summary judgment motions. Rule 56(a) 
prov ides: 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declara-
tory judgment may, at any time after the expiration 
of twenty days from the commencement of the action 
or after service of a motion for summary judgment by 
the adverse party, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon 
all or any part thereof. [Emphasis added]. 
The underscored language refutes plaintiff's first two alle-
gations of error. 
A. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
Timely. 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was not filed 
until the plaintiff's Complaint had been on file for over 
nine months, a much longer time period than the twenty days 
reguired by Rule 56(a). The motion was therefore timely 
filed. 
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The plaintiff impliedly argues that the defendants' 
motion was also premature because the plaintiff still con-
templated doing additional discovery. [Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 12-13]. Plaintiff's desire to pursue further discovery 
is not a sufficient ground for denying defendants' motion. 
Only when an adverse party indicates to the court that he is 
unable to respond to a motion for summary judgment because of 
a lack of discovery need further discovery be allowed prior 
to the trial court ruling on the motion. Strand v. Assoc. 
Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Utah 
1977). If that is the case, the proper procedure is for the 
adverse party to file with the court an affidavit setting out 
the reasons why he needs further discovery to oppose the 
motion. Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. No affi-
davit was filed by counsel for plaintiff in this case. Even 
where a proper affidavit is filed, it is not an abuse of the 
court's discretion to deny the party's request for further 
time to do discovery where the party has had ample time to 
initiate discovery but has done little or nothing. ~ 
v. City of Green River, 642 P.2d 443, 444, n. 2 (Wyo. 1982) 
[Plaintiff did not pursue discovery during three months 
between filing of complaint and defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment]. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to depose 
defendants or whomever he wished prior to the filing of 
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defendants' motion, or to file an affidavit telling the trial 
'~"urt why additional time was needed. 
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was Properly 
Supported. 
The language of Rule 56 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, specifically recognizes that a party may move for 
summary judgment with or without supporting affidavits. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, summary judgment may still 
be appropriate where the moving party relies, as in this 
case, upon depositions and not affidavits in support of his 
motion. Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348, 352 
(1973) [Citing United American Life Ins. Co. v. Willey, 21 
Utah 2d 279, 444 P.2d 755 (1968)]. 
c. Plaintiff did not Present Timely Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion in the Lower Court. 
Once a defendant files a motion for summary judgment with 
supporting evidence challenging the allegations of the com-
plaint, a plaintiff may not rest on his pleading but must 
respond and set forth specific facts which show that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 
g39 (Utah 1979); Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If he fails to so respond, judgment may be entered against 
him. Id. 
The practice of the lower court with respect to motions 
for summary judgment is governed not only by Rule 56, Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, but by Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice 
in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of 
Utah. Rule 2.8 provides: 
(a) All motions, except in uncontested or 
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a state-
ment of points and authorities and any affidavits 
relied upon in support thereof. 
(b) The responding party shall file and serve 
upon all parties within ten (10) days after service 
of the motion, a statement of answering points and 
authorities and counter affidavits. 
(c) The moving party may serve and file reply 
points and authorities within five (5) days after 
service of responding party's points and authori-
ties. Upon the expiration of such five (5) day 
period to file reply points and authorities, either 
party may notify the clerk to submit the matter for 
decision. 
(d) Decision shall be rendered without oral 
argument unless oral argument is requested by the 
court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and 
time for argument. 
(e) In all cases where the granting of a 
motion whould dispose of the action on the merits, 
with prejudice, the party resisting the motion may 
request oral argument, and such request shall be 
granted unless the motion has been summarily 
denied. If no such request is made, oral argument 
shall be deemed to have been waived. 
(f) Provided, however, that any District Court 
and any Circuit Court by order of the Judge or 
Judges of the court may exclude that court from the 
operation of this rule 2.8 in which case an alter-
native procedure shall be prescribed by written 
administrative order or rule. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to 
Publish, along with the required supporting Memorandum of 
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points and Authorities, was served upon counsel for plaintiff 
by mail on May 25, 1983. Plaintiff has never denied receipt 
of these documents. Allowing time for mailing, plaintiff's 
response to the motion and any request for oral argument were 
due on or before June 7, 1983. Judge Burns calculated the 
same timetable and placed the matter on his calendar for that 
day. Judge Burns called the matter on June 7. No response 
had been filed. Judge Burns then continued the matter to the 
following day's calendar, by which time any written response 
would have to have been filed. Plaintiff did not appear on 
June 8 and no opposing memorandum or counter-affidavits were 
on file. Judge Burns then took the matter under advisement. 
The following day, June 9, 1983, defense counsel was 
notified that their Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. 
A form of judgment was prepared and mailed to Judge Burns and 
plaintiff's counsel that same day. Counsel for plaintiff 
claims he did not know the motion had been granted, although 
he has never denied receipt of the proposed form of Judgment 
with transmittal letter. [Brief of Appellant, p. 12). 
Despite this denial, it seems more than a coincidence that 
plaintiff submitted deposition abstracts, memoranda, notices 
of deposition, and other materials in opposition to defen-
dants' motion just after he received the summary judgment and 
transmittal letter. 
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Plaintiff argues in his brief that, even though he fai]ef 
to file timely opposition to defendants' motion, Judge Burns 
erred in granting the motion because a question of material 
fact concerning the issue of defendants' willful misconduct 
can be found in the deposition testimony available for review 
by the lower court. Even assuming arguendo that (1) a ques-
tion of fact exists upon the deposition testimony, and (2) 
the depositions are part of the appellate record, plaintiff 
has still not shown that the lower court erred in granting 
defendants' motion. The plaintiff, not the trial court, has 
the responsibility to search the record below and set out, ~ 
timely opposition, the facts which show a material issue for 
trial which precludes summary judgment. A trial court's 
crowded calendar does not permit it to do the lawyer's work 
as well as its own, searching hundreds of pages of deposition 
testimony for evidence to support a plaintiff's case prior to 
ruling. Plaintiff's argued position not only reads Rule 
56(e) out of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but rewards 
indolence rather than diligence. 
POINT III. 
UNDER PRESENT UTAH LAW, THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
LOWER COURT WAS PROPER UPON ANY VIEW OF THE 
RECORD. 
These defendants contend, as argued in the foregoing 
points, that the plaintiff has waived his right to rely upon 
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the deposition testimony taken below to contest the lower 
court's ruling because: (1) the depositions are not properly 
a part of the record on appeal: and (2) the plaintiff did not 
rely upon the depositions to formulate a timely opposition to 
defendants' motion in the lower court. While reasserting 
this position, defendants feel it is appropriate, given the 
plaintiff's reference in his brief to selected parts of the 
deposition testimony, to refer to the depositions to show the 
court that Judge Burns' decision is proper and should be 
affirmed upon any state of the record. The Statement of 
Facts with accompanying deposition references set forth in 
plaintiff's brief is incomplete and, as to several matters, 
inaccurate and misleading. The following is offered to sup-
plement and correct the plaintiff's recitation of the facts. 
The accident occurred on Friday, April 23, 1982. At the 
time of the accident, defendant Tracy Stratton and Timothy 
Johnathan wood were students at Hurricane High School. The 
two boys were good friends. They lifted weights together and 
belonged to a close circle of friends which included Donette 
Gubler, Diane Gubler, Gail Ruesch, Hein Ha and Paul Keene. 
[Deposition of Paul Keene, taken October 18, 1982, pp. 6-7 
(hereinafter "Keene"): deposition of Donette Gubler, taken 
Oclober 18, 1982, pp. 7, 9, 11 (hereinafter "Gubler"): 
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deposition of Gail Ruesch, taken October 18, 1982, pp. 5-6, R 
(hereinafter "Ruesch")]. 
The day of the accident, Friday, was a slow day at the 
high school; most of the students were away at a track meet 
and there was little going on. [Keene, pp. 9-10]. As Tracy 
Stratton returned from eating lunch at home, Diane Gubler 
asked him to give her, Donette and Gail a ride in his 
father's Bronco. Tracy obliged and the group took a short 
drive down Main Street in Hurricane. [Gubler, pp. 24-27; 
Ruesch, pp. 10-13]. When they returned to the school, Tracy 
parked the vehicle and got out to talk to Tim Wood, Paul 
Keene, Hein Ha and some other boys standing nearby; the girls 
remained in the Bronco listening to music. [Gubler, p. 29]. 
The group was bored and so decided to go for a ride. [Keene, 
pp. 9-10; Gubler, p. 30; Ruesch, p. 11]. Tracy, Tim, Paul 
and Hein got in the Bronco with the girls and the group of 
seven teenagers left the high school headed out nearby "air-
port road." Tracy was driving and Tim was seated in the rear 
on the passenger side next to his girlfriend, Gail Ruesch. 
[Ruesch, p. 18]. 
Airport road is a common place for Hurricane teenagers 
and other local residents to go for a drive. [Keene, p. 
14]. The road runs to the airport through an open, rural 
area outside the city limits. Out past the airport is an 
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area known as the "boneyard" where animal carcasses are dis-
carded. [Keene, pp. 9-10]. Many students drive around the 
dirt roads in the area and it is a popular hunting place. 
The "boneyard" is also the home of a local legend, the "devil 
worshipers," and is reputed to be a "scary" place. 
pp. 22-23, 74; Ruesch, pp. 31-32]. 
[Gubler, 
Some distance along the road, out past the city limits, 
is a gentle S-shaped curve. [Gubler, Ex. l]. In the middle 
of the curve lies a depression in the asphalt roadway caused 
by water runoff and soil erosion. The depression is 2-3 feet 
deep on the left side (as one drives towards the airport) and 
tapers off towards the right. [Gubler, pp. 41, 53-54]. The 
depression or "bump" had been in the roadway sometime prior 
to April 23, 1982, and both students and community residents 
have been known to "bounce" their cars a little as they went 
through it. [Gubler, pp. 20-21, 48, 73; Deposition of Hein 
Ha, taken October 18, 1982, pp. 15, 20 (hereinafter "Ha")]. 
There were several such depressions along this road, some 
worse than the one involved in the accident. [Gubler, p. 
73]. All of the passengers in the Bronco, with the exception 
of Donette Gubler and Gail Ruesch, were familiar with the 
road and had been through the bump prior to April 23, 1982. 
[Keene, p. 12; Ha, p. 13; Gubler, pp. 20-21; Ruesch, p. 19]. 
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The accident occurred as Tracy Stratton drove the Bronr,, 
through the bump in the curve. The weight of the fully 
loaded vehicle and its speed caused it to bounce as it came 
out of the depression and the vehicle slid into gravel on the 
shoulder of the road. Tracy tried to regain control of the 
vehicle and successfully pulled it back onto the road sur-
face, but the vehicle then skidded again and rolled over, 
finally stopping some distance from the curve. Tracy was not 
intoxicated at the time, and none of the passengers had paid 
him for the ride. [Keene, p. 25: Gubler, p. 38). 
The depositions do not support several assertions made in 
plaintiff's Statement of Facts. Contrary to plaintiff's rep-
resentation, Donette Gubler's deposition testimony does not 
actually establish a speed estimate of 60-65 miles per hour. 
[Brief of Appellant, p. 4). 
Q. When you testified with respect to a speed 
estimate of 60 to 65, that is just a guess isn't it? 
A. Yes. It's from what other people say, 
because personally, myself I really don't know. 
Q. You have no idea whatsoever of what his 
speed was just prior to the time he hit the dip? 
A. Right. So it doesn't give me the right to 
say how fast. I don't know. 
Q. In fact, from the time you crossed the bridge 
up until the moment that you crashed, you really have no 
recollection of your own whatsoever, do you? 
A. No, I don't. 
p. 77, 11. 1-4). 
[Gubler, p. 76, 11. 18-25, 
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Plaintiff correctly states Gail Ruesch's claim that she 
asked to be let out of the Bronco as they approached the 
bump. [Brief of Appellant, p. 4]. However, plaintiff omits 
Tim Wood's calm response to his girlfriend's alleged hys-
terics. 
Only Tim heard that, I think. Donette said she 
heard something about that too. And he goes, It's 
okay. 
Q. Who said, It's okay? 
A. Tim said, It's okay. It's okay. Then we 
hit the bump, and everybody was laughing, like • 
• • • 
Q. Did he say it in an excited manner, or did 
he say it to calm you down, or what was the tone of 
his voice. 
A. Like, It's okay. Now what does that mean? 
Q. It was a no-big-deal "It's okay"? 
A. Yes. 
[Ruesch, p. 24, 11. 20-24, p. 26, 11. 11-15]. 
Most importantly, there is no evidence, nor any permissi-
, ble inference from the evidence, that Tracy Stratton intended 
to frighten anyone, least of all Tim wood, by trying to get 
his vehicle airborne through the dip. Plaintiff states in 
his brief: "There is some evidence that the young men 
involved, including the driver, intended to frighten the 
girls and made plans to do so shortly prior to entering the 
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Bronco vehicle for the drive which resulted in the injuries 
and death complained of." [Brief of Appellant, p. 5]. The 
testimony cited in support of this statement says nothing 
more than that the football players at Hurricane High School 
had talked during the preceding week about scaring new cheet-
leaders by taking them out to the "boneyard" at night to 
visit the "devil worshippers." [Ha, p. 16-17]. That hardly 
equates with a plan conceived by Tracy, Tim, Hein and Paul, 
just before the accident to frighten these particular girls 
by flying the Bronco through the dip in the airport road. 
Plaintiff's stretch to prove an intent to harm on Tracy's 
part is, however, understandable. As will be shown, without 
such proof plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law under 
the Utah Guest Statute and its supporting case law. 
The Utah Guest Statute, Utah Code Ann. §41-9-1 ~· 
(1953), bars any right of recovery against the driver or 
owner of a motor vehicle for the death or injury of a non-
paying passenger, unless the claimant can establish the 
driver was intoxicated or guilty of willful misconduct and 
that such was the proximate cause of the injury or death. 
The guest statute has been repeatedly upheld as constitu-
tional by both the Utah and United States Supre~e Courts. 
Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah 1974), cert. den. 419 
U.S. 810, reh. den. 419 U.S. 1060. It is undisputed that 
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Timothy Johnathan Wood was a "guest" in the Stratton vehicle 
at the time of the accident and that Tracy Stratton was not 
intoxicated. Therefore, unless the plaintiffs can establish 
that Tracy Stratton was guilty of "willful misconduct" the 
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Utah Guest Statute is the established law of this 
state and any exceptions to its general application are to be 
narrowly construed. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 (1953). Con-
sistent with this policy, the Utah Supreme Court has inter-
preted the "willful misconduct" exception of the Guest 
Statute as having a very limited application. The standard 
for determining what acts constitute "willful misconduct" was 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Stack v. Kearnes, 221 
P.2d 594 (Utah 1950), and has been consistently followed 
since. In that case the court approved instructions defining 
"willful misconduct" as: 
[T]he intentional doing of an act or intentional 
failing to do an act, with knowledge that serious 
injury is a probable and not merely possible result, 
or the intentional doing of an act with wanton and 
reckless disregard of the possible consequences. It 
involves deliberate intentional or wanton conduct in 
doing or omitting to do an act with knowledge or 
appreciation that injury is likely to result there-
from. 
2?1 P.2d at 597. 
The stated test requires that the act be intentional and 
done with actual knowledge that the probable result will be 
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serious injury. Gross negligence will not suffice, nor will 
even a "rash inadvertence to consequences." State v. 
Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183, 187 (1960). 
The application of this strict standard is best demon-
strated by Mukasey v. Aaron, 20 Utah 2d 383, 438 P.2d 702 
(1968), a case which closely parallels the case at hand. In 
Mukasey, the plaintiff-passenger was injured when the car in 
which he was riding failed to negotiate a curve and over-
turned. Weather conditions and visibility were good. The 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant-driver was guilty of 
willful misconduct in approaching the curve at 50 miles per 
hour without maintaining a proper lookout and in failing to 
observe that the curve could not be negotiated at that rate 
of speed. 483 P.2d at 703. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
summary judgment granted the defendant by the lower court, 
agreeing that the evidence demonstrated nothing more than 
simple negligence and that there was no issue of willful mis-
conduct for the jury. 438 P.2d at 704. 
Similarly, there is no evidence in this case which would 
support a finding of willful misconduct against Tracy 
Stratton under the standards enunciated by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Nothing in the record suggests that Tracy was even 
aware that driving through the depression with a loaded 
vehicle might result in serious injury to his passengers; he 
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had bPPn along that part of the road before and through the 
bump without accident or injury. He certainly did not intend 
or wish to harm anyone, least of all these close school 
friends. At most, he is guilty of a mistake of judgment in 
failing to realize that the added weight of his additional 
passengers would cause a problem while going through the 
depression. This oversight, although regrettable, certainly 
does not rise above the level of simple negligence. 2 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff has not met his affirmative burden of 
demonstrating, upon the record properly before this Court, 
that the lower court erred in granting judgment in favor of 
these defendants. Indeed, plaintiff did not even attempt to 
make a timely showing to the lower court of a remaining issue 
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment for 
the defendants. Justice is not served by allowing the plain-
2 The plaintiff's reliance upon Stack v. Kearnes, 
supra, to suggest otherwise is misplaced. The defendant's 
rnnduct in that case included a late-night, high-speed race 
•hrough a residential section of Salt Lake City, •stunt-
dr ivi ng", and "laughing off" repeated requests from his 
passengers to slow his speed, choosing instead to "pour it 
on". 221 P.2d at 596-97. 
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tiff to repeatedly ignore the procedural rules establishPrl b; 
this Court to the prejudice of the defendants. 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents Winston Stratton 
and Tracy Stratton requestfully urge this Court to affirm the 
judgment of the lower court. 
DATED this l~~M day of October, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
ByB~~ 
Attorneys for Respondents 
-24-
APPENDIX 
-25-
.,.:.<>:,c c. c-" ~,! .. 5l.. ...., c ,,.._~ c. E'" 
Dt~: l ,.,.c:i·,._~., 
DA•"'_;,": "' e(<>D• 
.. J ...... , ~ ( ,[ c.c. 
.,[,,, " I' c•llf![QT 
0•• C " <;,A:..( 
.. or .... ,~ .. o<>•o .. 
A.c.A!, ' ..... 11';0 .. 
~0-" t c.••tS 
" e<>c"' s•c• .. C .. $ 
t., o~ J .... ,, •• ,.5 
I>( ..... : " ("'A"OALL 
..... : -.;.[' : tiJt.: ~~ "" 
llCl!oE~' ,. -l .. :c "' "" 
Cf .. '-'"' c re".:,-~ 
"'"·( [ - ~t .. ,,( ... 
D•"·: J c .,'. •. t':-. 
•a.,.tJ. C .. pr(<0·.~·-
LAW Qf"t1[[5 
S:-<O\\", CHHISTE:'<SE:-< & 1'!AHTI:-OEA1' 
SA:.. T LAKE C 1~• ,__'Tt.'"' e.:. 
June 9, 1983 
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
District Judge 
Fifth Judicial District Court 
220 North 200 East 
St. Georae, Utah 84770 
!l.e: Timothy Leona re \'lood, et al. v. Winston Stratton, et .. 
Civil No. 8594, Washington County 
Dear Judge Burns: 
Enclosed please find the Su=ary Judg;:ient which •:e ha\'e 
prepared in the above-capitioned matter, pursuant to your 
directions. A copy has been submitted to Mr. Scarth pursuant 
to Rule 2.9. l'Je would appreciate it if the Clerk's office ;:cc:: 
notify us as to the date the SlIBl.-:iary Judgment is entered; a se'.'-
addressec postcard is enclosed for that purpose. 
We appreciate your cooperation in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CH'1.ISTENSSN & M.ARTI'\'.:;:· 
~~]).JLt. it.~ 
Bruce Hf Jn sen 
BHJ:pw 
Enclosure 
cc: Jim R. Scarth, Esq. 
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